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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LESTER ROMERO, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
DICK HANSEN, \ 
Defendant/Appellee. ] 
) Docket No. 970334-CA 
i Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to 
Section 78-2a-3 (2) (k) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court err in refusing to set aside a 
dismissal with prejudice, which was based upon a stipulation filed 
by counsel for the parties, where Appellee/ Defendant had fully 
performed the terms of settlement? Reviewed under the abuse of 
discretion standard, Goodmansen v. Liberty Vending Systems, Inc., 
866 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah App. 1993). 
2. Did the trial court's decision to enforce the written 
stipulation for dismissal with prejudice, entered into the record 
by counsel for the parties, deprive Appellant of due process of 
law? Reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, Goodmansen v. 
Liberty Vending Systems, Inc., 866 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah App. 1993). 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND 
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT. 
This is an appeal from a post-judgment order denying 
Plaintiff's motion to set aside a stipulation for dismissal with 
prejudice. Trial in this matter was originally scheduled for 
September 30, 1996, however, four days prior to that date, counsel 
for the parties negotiated a settlement, and executed a stipulation 
on behalf of their clients dismissing all pending claims with 
prejudice. (Record 279) Upon being appraised by counsel that a 
settlement had been achieved the Honorable Timothy Hansen struck 
the trial. (Record 278) 
On October 3, 1996, Plaintiff filed a pro-se motion requesting 
that the court set aside the dismissal, claiming that his counsel 
had acted improperly in settling the case. (Record 281) Defendant 
filed a memorandum in opposition (Record 284-291), and on or about 
December 9, 1997, Judge Timothy Hansen issued a minute entry 
denying Plaintifffs request to set aside the dismissal. (Record 
294-295) . A final order denying Plaintiff's request was entered on 
December 26, 1996. (Record 297-298) 
Other than the motion to set aside the dismissal, no post 
judgment motions were filed by either party. 
2 
B. STATEMENT OF THE RELEVANT FACTS OF THE CASE; 
1. Plaintiff/Appellant brought this action, alleging that 
Defendant/Appellee Hansen improperly sold a 1974 Marhmon Truck 
which he had left at Mr. Hansen's business premises. (Record 1) 
2. On September 24, 1997 counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant, 
Lynn Heward, and counsel for Defendant/Appellee, John B. Anderson, 
executed a stipulation for dismissal with prejudice of all claims 
against Defendant/Appellee Dick Hansen, and filed the stipulation 
with the trial court. (Record 279) 
4. Defendant/Appellee Richard Hansen paid the sum of 
$2,000.00 as consideration for the dismissal of the action. 
(Record 291) 
5. Plaintiff/Appellant filed a motion to set aside the 
dismissal, alleging that his counsel had improperly settled the 
action against Appellee. (Record 281) 
6. Defendant/Appellee filed a memorandum seeking enforcement 
of the stipulation and dismissal. (Record 284-291) 
7. In a minute entry signed on December 9, 1996, Judge 
Timothy R. Hansen denied Plaintiff/Appellant!s motion. (Record 294-
295) 
8. A final order denying Plaintiff/Appellantfs motion to set 
aside the dismissal with prejudice was entered on December 26, 
1996. (Record 297-298) 
3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Appellantfs brief does not comply with the provisions of 
Rule 24(9) of the Utah R. App. P., as Appellant has failed to set 
forth meaningful argument, supported by citations to the record and 
relevant statutory and/or case law. The court should decline to 
consider the appeal and affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
2. The court did not abuse its discretion in declining to set 
aside a dismissal with prejudice, which had been filed by the 
parties1 counsel. Appellantfs counsel was acting as his agent 
when he accepted Appellee's settlement offer, and Appellant is 
bound by the settlement under the doctrine of apparent authority. 
3. The trial court may enforce an oral settlement agreement, 
and Appellant!s refusal to execute a written release of claims does 
not preclude the trial court's enforcement of the agreement. 
4. Appellant was not denied due process by the trial court's 
enforcement of the agreement. Appellant has failed to identify 
what due process right was implicated by the trial court's action, 
and Appellant was not entitled to his "day in court" because an 
enforceable settlement agreement had been reached. 
5. Appellee should recover his costs and attorney's fees. 
Appellant has failed to set forth any argument, supported by 
citation to authority, in favor of his claim that the trial court 
erred in enforcing the agreement. Additionally, Appellant's claim 
that he is not bound by the agreement because he did not sign the 
written stipulation is contrary to established case law. 
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ARGUMENT 
(I) 
THE APPEAL MUST FAIL BECAUSE APPELLANT HAS 
FAILED TO SET FORTH ANY ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF 
HIS POSITION, AS REQUIRED BY RULE 24(9) OF THE 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE. 
Defendant/Appellee requests that the Court reject this appeal 
in the first instance, because Plaintiff/Appellant has failed to 
comply with Rule 24(9), Utah R. App. P., which requires that an 
appellant's brief contain an argument, including "contentions and 
reasons with respect to the issues presented ..." and lf. . . 
citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the record 
relied on." 
Even a cursory review of the brief submitted by the appellant 
demonstrates that he has failed to comply with these provisions. 
The document not only lacks any citation to authority which would 
support a decision to overturn the trial court's determination that 
the parties entered into a binding stipulation and settlement 
agreement, it utterly fails to set forth any coherent argument. 
In fact, the only portion of the brief that even approaches 
the level of argument is contained in two conclusory allegations 
found in the appellant's statement of relevant facts. In the first 
appellant claims that he "thinks that the law requires that I have 
my day in Court, and that Attorney Lynn Heward and Attorney John B. 
Anderson should not be able to set my rights just because I hired 
Attorney Lynn Heward does not give him the right to prepair 
documents and make settlement with out my oral or witten 
5 
consent(sic)." (Appellant's Brief, p. 5). In the second, Appellant 
asserts that "Attorney Anderson sates a number of laws he sates his 
possession, but no where does he state that there is a document 
signed by me to settle this law suite. Ther for this settment 
should be set for trial (sic)" (Appellantfs Brief, p.5.) 
On at least two prior occasions, this court has made clear 
that the failure to set forth a reasoned argument, supported by 
citations to authority, is grounds for it to decline to address the 
issues and assume the correctness of the judgment below. English v. 
Standard Optical Co., 814 P.2d 613, 618 (Utah App. 1991) and Evans 
By and Through Evans v. Doty, 824 P.2d 460, 469 (Utah App. 1992). 
In Evans this court summarily refused to consider an issue which 
was raised only by a short statement in the "issues" portion of the 
brief, without further argument, ruling that because the appellant 
had not: 
"... sufficiently briefed or argued the issue 
on appeal, we decline to address its merits. 
Generally, this court will not manufacture a 
legal argument for an appellant who fails to 
brief or argue an issue." Id., at 469. 
The situation addressed in Evans is nearly identical to that 
presented here. Appellant has set forth two issues for the courtfs 
consideration: (1) whether he was deprived of due process of law, 
and (2) whether the stipulation entered into by his attorney was 
binding without his signature on a settlement agreement: however, 
he has made no argument in favor of his position, other than the 
two conclusory allegations made in his statement of relevant facts. 
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Consistent with the ruling in Evans the Court should now refuse to 
consider all issues raised in Appellant's brief that are not 
supported by adequate argument. The Court should therefore deny 
Appellant all relief requested in his brief. 
(ID 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN ENFORCING THE STIPULATION FOR DISMISSAL 
WITH PREJUDICE EXECUTED AND FILED BY 
COUNSEL FOR THE LITIGANTS. 
The decision of a trial court to summarily enforce a 
settlement agreement is reviewed under an abuse of discretion 
standard.1 Goodmansen v. Liberty Vending Systems, Inc., 866 P.2d 
581, 584 (Utah App. 1993). In order to determine whether such an 
abuse of discretion occurred, two questions should ordinarily be 
addressed: first, whether the court abused its discretion in 
finding that there was a binding agreement; and, second, whether 
the non-performing party has a substantial excuse for its non-
performance. Zions Bank v. Barbara Jensen Interiors, Inc., 781 P. 2d 
478, 479 (Utah App. 1989). 
1
 While the appellate courts have recognized that "abuse of 
discretion11 is a term which is incapable of precise definition, and 
which encompasses a broad spectrum of possible review, in State v. 
White, 880 P.2d 18, 20 (Utah App. 1994), this court stated that one 
way to determine whether the trial court has abused its discretion 
is to ascertain whether its ruling "was beyond the limits of 
reasonability". This is the definition that makes most sense in 
this case. 
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Here, Appellant has focused all of his attention on the first 
prong of this test, alleging that there is no enforceable agreement 
because he did not personally assent to the terms2 agreed to by 
counsel, and because he did not execute the final settlement 
document. As will be explained in greater detail directly below, 
neither of these allegations are supported by the facts in the 
record or by relevant case law. Accordingly, this court must find 
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to 
set aside the stipulation for dismissal with prejudice. 
(a) 
ATTORNEY HEWARD WAS ACTING AS APPELLANT'S 
AGENT IN SETTLING THE CASE AND STIPULATING 
TO ITS DISMISSAL. APPELLANT IS BOUND BY 
THE ACTS OF HIS AGENT. 
In support of his request that this court overturn the trial 
court's decision to enforce the stipulation filed by counsel in 
this matter, Appellant asserts that his attorney, Mr. Lynn Heward, 
was not entitled to accept the settlement proposed by Appellee, and 
that Mr. Heward!s acceptance of the offer and subsequent execution 
of the stipulation for dismissal with prejudice did not create a 
enforceable agreement. (Appellant's Brief, p. 5) In making this 
claim, Appellant ignores the basic principles of agency, which when 
applied to the facts in the record demonstrate the correctness of 
Judge Hansen's decision. 
2
 It must be emphasized that Appellant does not argue that no 
agreement was reached, rather, his sole claim is that he is not 
bound thereby. 
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In analyzing Appellant's claim, the court must first determine 
whether Mr. Heward, when acting in his capacity as legal counsel, 
was also acting as an agent for his client. Well established case 
and statutory authority confirm that this question may be answered 
only in the affirmative. (See Goodmansen v. Liberty Vending 
Systems, Inc., supra at 584: a client may be bound by the acts of 
its attorney under the doctrine of apparent authority. See also 
Utah Code Ann., §78-51-32 (1953, as amended), an attorney has 
authority to bind his client in any step of the litigation.) 
Indeed in the brief he filed with this court, Appellant concedes 
that his counsel was authorized to act as his agent and to conduct 
settlement negotiations in connection with the lawsuit against Mr. 
Hansen. (Appellant's Brief, p. 5: "Attorney Lynn Heward has the 
rights to negotate (sic) my rights...11 ) 
With the question of status settled, the sole remaining issue 
is whether a settlement negotiated by Mr. Heward is binding on 
Appellant, if Mr. Heward accepted terms which were less than those 
authorized by the Appellant3. 
In addressing this issue in the trial court, Appellee argued 
that under the doctrine of apparent authority Mr. Hewardfs 
acceptance of his settlement offer, and the subsequent negotiation 
3
 Appellee does not conceded that there is any proof that 
Attorney Heward exceeded his authority in accepting the settlement 
of $2,00.00. Exhibits l-A and 1-C to Appellant's brief indicate 
that Mr. Heward had discussed the terms of settlement with 
Appellant, and understood that they were acceptable. 
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of the settlement check, bound Appellant to honor the terms of the 
agreement. (Record 284-291) This argument is well supported by 
established case law. (See Forsyth v. Pendleton, 617 P.2d 358, 360 
(Utah 1980) , where the Utah Supreme Court held that principals are 
bound by the acts of their agents, when those acts are within the 
scope of the authority apparently possessed by the agent.) 
In Luddington v. Bodenvest, Ltd., 855 P.2d 204 (Utah 1993) the 
Utah Supreme Court held that the following elements must be 
established in order to demonstrate that an agent is acting with 
apparent authority: 
11
 (1) that the principal has manifested his consent 
to the exercise of such authority ... (2) that the 
third person knew of the facts and, acting in good 
faith, had reason to believe and did actually be-
lieve that the agent possessed such authority; and, 
(3) that the third person, relying on such appearance 
of authority, has changed his position and will be 
injured or suffer loss if the ... transaction exe-
cuted by the agent does not bind the principal." 
Id., 209. 
Clearly the record demonstrates that Mr. Heward was clothed 
with the authority to settle the litigation.4 First, as set forth 
The question of whether an attorney has apparent authority 
to bind his client may well be settled by dicta in Goodmansen v. 
Liberty Vending Systems, Inc. , 866, P.2d 581, 584, (Utah App. 1993) 
where this court noted, with approval, that the Appellants had 
conceded that they were bound by the acts of their counsel, under 
the doctrine of appendant authority. See also Forsyth v. 
Pendleton, 617 P.2d 358,360-361 (Utah 1980), in which the Utah 
Supreme Court upheld a trial court's determination that 
representations by defendants attorney that the plaintiff could 
adopt a payment schedule different from that set forth in a 
contract for the sale of land were binding upon the defendant under 
the doctrine of apparent authority. 
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above, Appellant has conceded that his attorney was authorized to 
enter into negotiations with Appellee's counsel to resolve the 
lawsuit. Second, Appellee's counsel had no reason to believe that 
Mr. Heward was not empowered to accept the offer of $2,000.00 in 
complete settlement of all claims. In fact, Appellee's counsel was 
ethically prohibited from contacting Appellant directly to 
determine whether the offer was acceptable. Thus, not only was 
Appellee's reliance upon Mr. Heward's representations reasonable 
under the circumstances, it was mandatory. Finally, there is no 
doubt that Appellee has changed his position in reliance upon the 
representations of Mr. Heward. He agreed to settle the lawsuit, 
and fully performed his obligations under the agreement by 
tendering payment to Appellant's agent. (Record 291) 
The only conclusions that may be drawn from these facts are 
that Mr. Heward was duly empowered to act on behalf of his client, 
and that under the circumstances Appellee was justified in his 
belief that Mr. Heward had authority to accept his offer of 
settlement. Since Mr. Heward possessed the apparent authority to 
make reasonable settlement arrangements, his acceptance of 
Appellee's offer, as reflected in the written stipulation for 
dismissal filed with the trial court (Record 279), is binding on 
his client. Accordingly the trial court's refusal to set aside the 
dismissal with prejudice was not an abuse of its discretion. 
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(b) 
ORAL SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS MAY BE ENFORCED, 
APPELLANT'S REFUSAL TO EXECUTE THE FINAL SETTLEMENT 
DOCUMENT DOES NOT RENDER THE AGREEMENT UNENFORCEABLE. 
Appellant also asks this court to overturn the trial court's 
decision to honor the stipulation for dismissal, because he did not 
sign any document manifesting his intent to settle the lawsuit. 
(Appellantfs Brief, p. 5, paragraph 10.) Essentially Appellant 
appears to claim that in order for a settlement to be binding there 
must be a written agreement, and he must have personally executed 
that document. This claim has no basis in law. 
The question of whether a written document, signed by the 
parties to the litigation, is required to create an enforceable 
settlement agreement was recently addressed by this court in John 
Deere Co. v. A & H Equipment, Inc., 876 P.2d 880 (Utah App. 1994). 
In that case counsel for Defendant proposed that the pending 
litigation be settled by a mutual dismissal of all claims with 
prejudice. Plaintiff's counsel accepted on behalf of his client, 
and a written memorialization of their agreement was prepared and 
presented to Defendant for its signature. Defendant, however, 
refused to sign the written agreement, claiming that the settlement 
proposed by its counsel did not contain all of the terms and 
conditions it desired. Plaintiff then moved to enforce the 
agreement, and Defendant opposed on the grounds that it had not 
signed the settlement document. The trial court determined that 
the terms of settlement offered by Defendant's counsel were 
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sufficiently clear, and that the acceptance of those terms by 
Plaintiff's counsel created an enforceable agreement. This court 
agreed with the trial court's analysis, and stated that the 
agreement was enforceable "despite the fact that it had not been 
reduced to writing and signed by the parties." Id., at 887. 
The issues and facts considered in John Deere are directly on 
point with those presented to the court by this appeal, and its 
holding should be dispositive of Appellant's request for relief. 
As in Deere, a clear offer of compromise was suggested by counsel 
for Appellee; i.e., the payment of $2,000.00 in return for a 
dismissal of all claims; and counsel for Appellant accepted the 
offer. Only after the negotiations were complete; the proposed 
compromise accepted; payment made; and, a written stipulation for 
dismissal filed with the court, pursuant to Rule 4-504(8) of the 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration; did Appellant come forth and 
state that his counsel had not obtained the settlement he desired. 
Again, as in the Deere case, Appellant refused to sign the 
settlement agreement, and seeks to rely upon that refusal as 
justification to set aside the agreement. The holding in Deere, 
however, makes clear that Appellant's claim that he is not bound by 
the settlement, merely because he did not sign a written 
memorialization of the agreement, is without basis. This court 
should follow its holding in Deere and uphold the trial court's 
decision to enforce the parties' stipulation for dismissal. 
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( I l l ) 
THE TRIAL COURT»S DECISION TO ENFORCE THE 
STIPULATION FOR DISMISSAL DID NOT DEPRIVE 
APPELLANT OF ANY DUE PROCESS RIGHT, 
Appellant also alleges that the decision of the trial court to 
enforce the stipulation for dismissal, which was executed and filed 
by the parties1 counsel pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code 
Jud. Admin,, deprived him of due process of law.5 Appellant has 
failed to identify the right that was infringed upon by the trial 
court's decision, however it appears that he believes that he has 
an absolute right to present his case at trial. This position is 
entirely without merit. 
It is indisputable that a trial court may summarily enforce a 
settlement agreement reached by the parties to litigation, and so 
long as it does not abuse its discretion in doing so its decision 
will be upheld on appeal. John Deere, supra, at 883. Naturally, 
the enforcement of a settlement agreement necessarily precludes the 
granting of a trial, and therefore Appellant's claim of an absolute 
right to trial is shown the be without any basis whatsoever. 
5
 Appellant has failed to set forth any argument in favor of 
his position, and, as argued in Section I, above, this alone should 
lead the court to deny his request for relief. The failure to 
specify the precise deprivation of due process also makes it 
difficult to determine which level of review the court should 
utilize in addressing Appellant's claim. As set forth in the body 
of this brief, the claim that Appellant was denied his nday in 
court11 is fundamentally no different than his claim that the trial 
court erred in enforcing the stipulation reached by counsel. 
Therefore Appellee believes that the issue should be addressed 
under the same level of review; the abuse of discretion standard. 
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As explained above, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in this case. Rather it determined that a binding 
agreement was reached by the parties, and it properly decided to 
enforce that agreement. Appellant's request for relief should be 
denied. 
(IV) 
APPELLANT HAS BROUGHT THIS APPEAL WITHOUT 
FACTUAL OR LEGAL BASIS. APPELLEE SHOULD BE AWARDED 
ITS COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES AS SANCTIONS. 
Rule 33 of the Utah R. App. P., provides that this court may 
award costs and attorney's fees as sanctions in the event that a 
party files a frivolous appeal, which is defined as "one which is 
not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based 
on a good faith argument to extend, modify or reverse existing 
law.11 Appellee would request that the court impose such sanctions 
against Appellant for violating the provisions of this rule. 
In Larson v. Overland Thrift and Loan, 818 P.2d 1316 (Utah 
App. 1992), this court considered the question of sanctions under 
Rule 33, and found that it was proper to assess costs and 
attorney's fees where the appellant had offered "absolutely no 
explanation11 to support its theory on appeal. Such is the case 
here. Appellant has utterly failed to set out any reason or 
argument in favor of his position that the trial court erred in 
upholding the stipulation for dismissal with prejudice, or in favor 
of his claim that the trial court1s decision denied him due process 
of law. 
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Additionally, Appellant's only attempt at argument; i.e., the 
conclusory allegation that he was not bound by the stipulation 
because he did not sign a formal release; is contrary to well 
established law. Had he made even the briefest review of 
the case and statutory authority on this issue, he would have found 
that this court has repeatedly enforced oral settlement agreements, 
and that it has expressly ruled that a written memorialization, 
signed by the parties to the litigation, is not necessary to form 
a binding contract for settlement. (See Goodmansen v. Liberty 
Vending Systems, Inc., supra, at 581; John Deere Co. , v. A & H 
Equipment, Inc., supra, at 887; and, Rule 4-504 Utah Code Jud. 
Admin.) 
In light of the obvious deficiencies in Appellant's brief, and 
in light of the fact that Appellantfs position is directly 
contradicted by well established authority, Appellee would pray 
that this court find that Appellant has filed a frivolous appeal, 
and award him his costs and attorney's fees incurred in defending 
this action. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in summarily 
enforcing the stipulation for dismissal with prejudice filed by the 
parties1 counsel in this matter. Mr. Heward was acting as 
Appellant's agent when he negotiated and accepted the settlement 
proposed by Appellee, and Appellant is bound by this acceptance 
under the doctrine of apparent authority, notwithstanding his 
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subsequent refusal to execute the document memorializing the 
agreement. Appellant has failed to set forth any argument to the 
contrary, and for this reason alone the Court of Appeals should 
uphold the decision of the trial court. 
This court should also sanction Appellant for filing an appeal 
that is unsupported by argument and which is not warranted by 
existing law. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this <^ k day of June, 1997. 
*£*//; &IAM%4& 
John ^^Anderson 
Michael Wright 
Attorneys for DeTehdant/Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the \3&~~ day of fjj^^f^ , 1997, 
two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoiraBrief of Appellee 
were mailed, postage prepaid, to Lester Romeyy; Pro Se, 6270 South 
2005 West, West Jordan, Utah 84084. 
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